STRATEGIC COMBINED JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND THE BALANCE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND COMMON INTEREST by Florin NEGULESCU
two basic tools at their disposal 
when enforcing the national interest-
diplomacy and force. But diplomatic 
negotiation implies compromise” 
(p. 3). Moreover, Clausewitz’s 
well-known  description of  war   
as a “continuation of policy  by   
other means”, broaden Chace’s 
observation (Howard & Paret, 2007, 
p. 28). Therefore, the only way to 
achieve the national interest when 
no compromise is possible is the 
application of power as depicted in 
Figure 1.
1. COMMON INTEREST 
IN TRANSNATIONAL 
ALLIANCES
Where commonality of interest 
exists, nations will enter political, 
economic, and military partnerships. 
These partnerships can occur in both 
regional and worldwide patterns as 
nations seek opportunities to promote 
their mutual national interests or 
seek mutual security against real or 
perceived threats (ABCA, 2008, p. ix). 
James Chace (2002) observed 
that, “Political leaders have only 
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two main causes of the formation 
and maintenance of a transnational 
coalition, shown in Figure 2, as: the 
common interest and the partners’ 
commitment to pursue together the 
achievement of a common objective 
(pp. 165-166).
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Figure 2.The Two Main Pillars of 
Transnational Coalitions
Beyond ethical considerations in 
international politics, the legitimacy 
of the national interest of a state is 
relative. What one state considers 
MXVWL¿HGDQGOHJLWLPDWHRWKHUSOD\HUV
in the international arena may 
consider illegitimate and unjust. 
Situations differ from case to case, but 
DQ\FRXQWU\ZLOODOZD\VWU\WREHQH¿W
from any opportunity to achieve its 
national objectives.
When the national interests of 
two or more states are convergent, 
building a political-military alliance 
PD\ EH DQ HI¿FLHQW ZD\ WR SXUVXH
that interest. Using this formula, 
the involved states share not only 
WKHEHQH¿WVRIWKHLUDFWLRQVEXWWKH
potential risks as well.
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Fig. 1. A Decision Cycle for Achieving 
National Interest
As Heaney and Rojas (2007) 
noted, “:KLOH WKH OHQJWK RI D
FRDOLWLRQ¶VOLIHPD\YDU\E\GHVLJQ 
LW  PD\  DOVR  ÀXFWXDWH  ZLWK  WKH 
YLFLVVLWXGHV  RI  SROLWLFV LQFOXGLQJ
LGHRORJLFDOGLVSXWHVDOWHUHGSROLWLFDO
RSSRUWXQLW\ VWUXFWXUHV GZLQGOLQJ
UHVRXUFHVDQGSHUVRQDOLW\FRQÀLFWV” 
S:KLOHWKHVHIDFWRUVLQÀXHQFH
the life of a coalition, they also have a 
PDMRULQÀXHQFHRYHUWKHIRUPDWLRQRI
a coalition. The political factor, as an 
expression of national interest, has a 
major role in shaping and maintaining 
a coalition.
Joe Bandy and Jakie Smith (2004) 
realized the importance of common 
interest in the birth of a coalition. 
They observed that, “many coalitions 
EHJLQ DV D ZD\  WR  VXSSRUW  RQO\ 
WHPSRUDU\  DQG  FOHDUO\  GHOLPLWHG 
IRUPVRIWUDQVQDWLRQDOFRRSHUDWLRQ” 
(p. 3). Moreover, exploring the matter 
of coalition formation and existence, operations cannot be carried out,   
or when they did not  achieve   
the  expected results. Strategic 
Combined Joint Special Operations 
may be utilized as force multipliers 
in support of conventional operations 
as well.
-3,GH¿QHVVSHFLDO
operations as ,,… RSHUDWLRQV
FRQGXFWHG LQ KRVWLOH GHQLHG, or
SROLWLFDOO\ VHQVLWLYH HQYLURQPHQWV 
WR DFKLHYH PLOLWDU\ GLSORPDWLF
LQIRUPDWLRQDO DQGRU HFRQRPLF
REMHFWLYHV HPSOR\LQJ PLOLWDU\
FDSDELOLWLHV IRU ZKLFK WKHUH LV
no broad conventional force 
UHTXLUHPHQW7KHVHRSHUDWLRQVRIWHQ
UHTXLUHFRYHUWFODQGHVWLQHRUORZ
YLVLELOLW\FDSDELOLWLHV”.
Because of these characteristics, 
Strategic Combined Special 
Operations can be used to solve a 
wide range of delicate international 
situations. This makes them very 
attractive for achieving the state’s 
national interests, and a transnational 
coalition’s common interests.
The multinational task force 
designated to execute Combined 
Joint Special Operations in order 
WR IXO¿OO WUDQVQDWLRQDO FRPPRQ
interests is nominated as a Combined 
Joint Special Operations Task Force 
(CJSOTF).
Therefore, a Combined Joint 
Special Operations Task Force is 
primarily the result of a military and 
political transnational cooperation 
between states that have decided to 
achieve common strategic interests 
by carrying out special operations.
2. COMMON INTEREST IN 
STRATEGIC COMBINED 
JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Based on the preceding paragraph, 
the common interest is the main 
element that generates and maintains 
transnational coalitions. When the 
IXO¿OOLQJRIWKHFRPPRQLQWHUHVWRI
a coalition requires the execution 
of strategic special operations,  by   
extension  we  can  say  that  the   
common  interest  generates strategic 
special operations as well. Therefore, 
strategic special operations may 
become valuable tools for two or more 
states that decide to form a coalition 
in order  to  pursue  the  achievement   
of  common  strategic  interests  in  a   
fragile international situation.
As Heaney and Rojas (2007) 
observed, coalitions vary in temporal 
stability. They may be ,,DGKRFDQG
VKRUWOLYHG” (sometimes formed 
exclusively for the purpose of 
staging a single event), or they may 
be ,,KLJKO\ LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HG DQG
HQGXULQJ’’ formed with the intention 
of addressing a wide range of issues 
over a long period of time. (p. 1) 
The speed, surgical accuracy, 
secrecy, and reduced costs are 
the characteristics that embody 
Commando type — strategic special 
operations for the quick resolution 
of potential crises from their earliest 
stages.
In  addition, special operations   
are viable  options for dealing  with 
SURWUDFWHG FRQÀLFWV ZKHQ GXH  WR
various reasons, conventional   national interest of a state as explained 
below (pp. 17-24).
a. Direct Relationship  between   
the Common Interest  of  the Coalition 
and the National Interest of a State.
7KH¿UVWVLWXDWLRQRFFXUVZKHQWKH
state’s national interests are similar 
to coalition’s common interest. This 
is an ideal and merely theoretical 
situation, but when the similarity 
of the national interests of coalition 
partners LVKLJKDQGUHÀHFWHGLQWKH 
common  interest  of  the  coalition,   
the  coalition  is  much stronger 
(Weitsman, 2008, pp. 7-8).
b. Complementary Relationship 
between the Common Interest of the 
Coalition and the National Interest of 
a State.
The second situation occurs 
when the state’s national interests 
LV QRW HQWLUHO\ UHÀHFWHG LQ WKH
coalition’s common interest. In 
this case, the national interest of a 
particular state is not necessarily 
similar to the common interest of the 
coalition.  However, the end   state 
of a coalition’s actions may prove 
advantageous to a particular member 
state by creating favorable conditions 
for further actions in pursuing its 
national interests (Weitsman, 2008, 
p. 5).
c. Opportunistic Relationship   
between  the  Common  Interest   
of  the Coalition and the National 
Interest of a State.
The  third  situation  arises  when   
some  countries  join  a  transnational 
coalition due  mainly to reasons 
related to the advantages that 
membership in such a coalition may 
offer.  The interest for participating in 
3. NATIONAL INTEREST 
VERSUS COALITION 
COMMON INTEREST
As previously stated, the 
participation in the construction of a 
Combined Joint Special Operations 
Task Force has a clear goal: to achieve 
a common interest by carrying out 
special operations. However, from 
case to case, this aspect has several 
different particularities.
A transnational coalition is   
usually  initiated  by  the  state  that   
has the highest national interest 
in solving the problem concerned. 
For this reason, the proportion of 
the national interest’s amount of a 
state, within the common interest of 
the coalition, may be unequal and 
nuanced.
Narlikar (2003) considered three 
different coalition building type’s 
theories: (1) theory highlighting an 
interest-based method of coalition-
building; (2) theory emphasizing 
processes and institutions; (3) 
constructivist theory: ideational 
(based on common beliefs and 
ideas) and identity-based method of 
coalition formation (pp. 17-33).
For the purpose of this paper, 
considering Narlikar’s (2003) 
analysis on the interest-based 
method of coalition-building, three 
main different situations whereby 
a state may participate in forming 
a political-military coalition may 
be distinguished. They are direct 
complementary and opportunistic 
relationship between the common 
interest of the coalition and the 4. CONCLUSIONS
The decision to participate in a 
transnational coalition in general and 
to conduct Strategic Combined Joint 
Special Operations in particular, is 
mainly a political-military decision. 
&RQVLGHULQJ WKH EHQH¿WV DQG ULVNV
that such a decision involves, political 
and military leaders should perform 
a detailed analysis of the situation. 
Answering the following questions 
can aid in making such decisions 
easier:
- Is  there  a  common  interest,  which   
requires  the  creation  of  a political-
military coalition, in order to carry 
out special operations for solving a 
case?
x Do the implied states have 
technical capabilities to 
participate with military forces 
in a combined joint special 
operation?
x How do coalition partners 
perceive the state’s national 
interest?
x How does the international arena 
perceive the state’s national 
interest?
x :KDWDUHWKHULVNVDQGEHQH¿WVRI
such an enterprise in terms of the 
state’s national interest? Are the 
risks acceptable?
x Do coalition partners agree to 
VKDUHERWKWKHEHQH¿WVDQGULVNV
related to coalition’s actions?
The main advantage in conducting 
Strategic Combined Joint Special 
Operations is that the states involved 
in such operations may share the 
EHQH¿WV FRVWV DQG ULVNV RI VXFK
coalition operations may be motivated 
by a degree of international or regional 
SUHVWLJH DQG LQÀXHQFH WKDW FDQ EH
gained (Weitsman, 2008, p. 5). 
The above relationships between   
national interest and coalition 
common interest are depicted below 
in Figure 3.
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Comparing presented coalition 
types, a much  stronger cohesion 
exist when there is a direct relation 
between the common interest of the 
coalition and the national interest 
of a state, and less strong when a 
opportunistic relation exists, as in 
Figure 4.
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an enterprise. However, for each 
state, the national interest, rather the 
common interest, is the main reason 
to be a member of the coalition. 
Accordingly, the balance between 
the national interest of a state and the 
common interest of a state coalition 
is the main element that dictates the 
best method in pursuing national 
interest.
Therefore, the choice between 
unilateral Strategic Special Operation 
and Strategic Combined Joint Special 
Operation – in solving a matter of 
a state’s national interest – should
be based on a comprehensive 
comparative analysis between the 
national interest of that state and 
the common interest of a potential 
coalition.
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